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By Philip A. Ebert
Know Your Own Competence
Backcountry skiing requires us to make decisions in an 
inherently uncertain environment with possibly fatal consequences. 
However, skills and competences to recognize and avoid the possible 
dangers in avalanche terrain can help to reduce these dangers and 
render the residual risk “acceptable.” Also, there is a sense in which to 
be a responsible backcountry enthusiast is to be one who has acquired 
competences to deal with the relevant dangers. Thus, being a competent 
decision-maker is not only important to reduce the overall risk involved, 
but also plays a pivotal role in rendering an engagement in so-called 
“extreme sports” socially acceptable.1
In this context, I want to raise an issue rarely discussed: while being 
competent is one important aspect for a responsible risk engagement, we 
should also ask the question what is required to assess whether a decision-
maker actually is competent or not. To raise this question is to reflect on 
what kind of evidence is available to a decision-maker to justifiably believe 
that he/she really is competent. 
Now, this issue should not be put down as “merely academic” or worse 
“philosophers’ musings,” but it is important to decision-making more 
generally. Here is why: let us for simplicity categorize decision-makers 
into two groups: competent and non-competent. Given that one is either 
competent or non-competent, a decision-maker might either correctly 
believe that she is competent, correctly believe that she is non-competent, 
falsely believe that she is competent, or lastly, falsely believe that she is 
non-competent. The category that is of most relevance to us is the one in 
which a decision-maker falsely believes that he/she is competent. Why 
is this? 
Well, first of all, falsely believing that one is competent will lead decision-
makers to wrongly think that they can reduce the various risks to an 
acceptable level, even though they, in fact, lack the relevant skills. Secondly, 
self-efficacy—the strength of one’s belief in ones own abilities—can play 
an important factor determining risk attitudes. That is, the greater your 
belief in your own competences in managing the risks, the more willing 
you might be to take on various risks.2 If, however, a decision-maker falsely 
believes himself to be competent, he/she might end up taking on higher 
risks even though he/she is non-competent—a possibly very dangerous 
situation. Lastly, there is a phenomenon called the “expert halo”: that group 
decisions in avalanche terrain are often strongly influenced by the person 
the group takes to be the most competent.3 If the group chooses the person 
who portrays her-/himself as being the most competent, yet she/he is 
wrong about it, then this might endanger not merely the decision-maker 
who falsely believes to be competent but groups as a whole!
So then what counts as good evidence for being a competent decision 
maker? In the following, we call this kind of evidence—evidence for being 
competent—higher-order evidence. Let us start with an extreme—and 
admittedly ludicrous—case. Imagine someone, let us call him Joker, who 
believes he has the “competence” to always choose the winning numbers in 
a lottery. An easy way to show that this belief in the presumed competence 
is unjustified is to have him play a handful of lotteries and look at the 
result. We will not require many cases in order to show that Joker suffers 
from an illusion of competence. On the other extreme, consider the case 
of a world-class archer, call her Erika. If we had any doubts as to whether 
her belief that she is a competent archer is justified, we could just look 
at the results of her exercising this very competence. Again, a handful 
of “shots” towards a suitably chosen target will suffice to show that she 
is competent and that she is justified in believing that she is competent. 
What these considerations suggest are that we can bootstrap from the 
results of exercising a competence on a critical number of cases to a justified 
belief in having this competence (or even lacking it). If this is correct, a 
similar reasoning should also apply in the case at issue: decision-making in 
avalanche terrain. Hence, successfully avoiding dangers such as avalanches 
over many years would then constitute higher-order evidence that one is 
a competent decision-maker. 
Now, I think this kind of reasoning—though intuitive in the case of 
Joker and Erika—is inappropriate and possibly dangerous when applied 
to avalanche decision-making and, more generally, in the case of many 
so-called “extreme sports.” Unfortunately, this inference is often (wrongly) 
made in media reports where experience is all-to-easily equated with 
competence. 
In order to see this, let me present a “thought-experiment”. Here is 
what we know: first, holding all else equal (including risk attitudes), a 
competent decision-maker is less likely to get caught in an avalanche than 
a non-competent decision-maker. Second, a competent decision-maker is 
not a perfect decision-maker and can get caught in an avalanche. Third, 
it is not very likely that skiers—competent and non-competent (ignoring 
reckless skiers)—do get avalanched. 
So, let’s assume for our thought-experiment that with 30 days of skiing 
per year over a ten-year period a non-competent, yet non-reckless skier, 
has a 1 in 10 chance of getting caught in an avalanche.4 Also, let’s assume 
that with appropriate training we can avoid 80% of avalanche accidents.5 
Hence, a competent decision-maker could then reduce their risk of getting 
avalanched over the same period of time to a mere 1 in 50. 
Now adopting for the sake of the thought-experiment these assumptions, 
consider the following scenario:
You arrive at a new backcountry ski area and you look for a ski partner. 
You don’t know how many competent or non-competent decision-makers 
are in the area. So to be careful and without further information your 
confidence is fairly low—say 2 out of 10—that a skier is a competent 
avalanche decision-maker. Having found a partner, you enquire about her 
backcountry experience, and she tells you that she skied off-piste for ten 
years at about 30 days a season and has never been caught in an avalanche. 
How much should this increase your confidence that your new partner 
is a competent decision-maker? Applying analogous reasoning as in the 
case of Erika the archer, would suggest that you should feel reasonably 
more confident. After all your potential partner successfully avoided 
avalanches over 10 years! 
However, given the assumption of the thought-experiment (i.e. the 
probabilities outlined above), and applying Bayes’ rule (a well-known 
theorem in probability theory), shows that your confidence should 
hardly increase at all: in fact, it should stay at 2.6 Indeed whatever your 
prior confidence on the scale from 0 to 10 is, having successfully avoided 
avalanches over a long period does not constitute much significant evidence 
for competent decision-making.7
Competence:  the quality of being competent; adequacy; 
possession of required skill, knowledge, qualification, 
or capacity.
—Dictionary.com
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UNCONSCIOUS Now, of course, this kind of thought-experiment has to be treated with much care. Numerous idealization and simplifying assumptions are made 
and so our conclusion should be carefully chosen. This much, however, 
seems reasonable: the result should caution against taking the fact that a 
decision-maker has successfully avoided avalanches over a long period 
of time as significant evidence that he/she is competent. 
This points to something very important. If competent decision-making 
in avalanche terrain is somewhere between the ludicrous Joker case who 
merely guesses and the case of Erika the archer who is extremely reliable 
and highly skilled, we have to acknowledge that simply looking at the 
outcome of exercising that competence is not the right approach to finding 
out whether someone is competent. To put this into a slogan, we can say: 
competence (most often) leads to success, but success itself does not indicate 
competence. So, we have to acknowledge that snow is a “wicked” learning 
environment with inconsistent feedback mechanisms that do not always 
properly reflect the appropriateness of an individual’s decision-making.8
Given this, the next step should be to inquire into what we can take 
as good evidence for regarding someone as a competent or incompetent 
avalanche decision-maker. Unfortunately, things are not straightforward 
and so let me finish by making some short remarks. 
1. First, if you repeatedly misjudge the stability of a slope and end up 
in avalanches, it’s time to reconsider your decision-making skills 
(and/or your risk attitude). Success is not a guarantee of competence, 
yet repeated failure is a decent indicator of a lack of competence.9
2. Second, an indicator of a lack of “full” competence is when a 
decision-maker puts forth overly confident “certainty” judgments. 
A truly competent decision-maker will always take into account the 
inherently uncertain nature of the snowpack and the resulting limits 
of their decision-making skills. Stability judgments can never be 
absolutely certain—after all even avalanche experts do get caught 
in avalanches. Also, let me remind you not to conflate confidence 
with competence. Whether or not confidence is rooted in a genuine 
competence is always a further question—people can be confident 
yet wholly incompetent! In that context, also be aware of the gender 
confidence gap: males tend be more confident and self-assured than 
females, when they are, in fact, equally competent. 
3. Third, a lesson to draw from the thought-experiment is that when 
assessing competence, focus more on how people manage to avoid 
avalanches, not simply that they do. For example, competent 
decision-makers, in contrast to non-competent ones, will typically 
be able to give good reasons for why a slope is safe/non-safe. 
4. Fourth, learn the good reasons. Knowing what the indicators of (in)
stability of a slope are will put you in a good position to assess 
whether your partner is a competent decision-maker. Also be aware 
of the not-good reasons. Avoid becoming subject to “heuristic traps”, 
don’t simply rely on someone’s track record in avoiding avalanches, 
and challenge a judgment that a slope is safe if it is based only on 
a sixth sense or an intuition—these are usually not based on good 
reasons. 
5. Fifth, engage in dialogue and consciously make decisions. Only if you 
and your partner engage in an explicit decision-making procedure 
can you test each other’s reasons for a given decision. Through this 
exercise, you can receive valuable feedback from your peers about 
how you arrived at your decision and whether it is based on good 
reasons. In this way, you can (justifiably) become more confident 
in your own competence. 
6. Sixth, consider to agree to shift the burden of proof in order to make 
sure to engage in a dialogue. So, instead of assuming that a slope is 
safe until proven not safe—assume that a slope is not safe until you 
agree it is safe. Doing this might slow you down, and, yes, making 
decisions and coming to an agreement can become a nuisance, 
especially when there is fresh powder to be had, but it will help 
you make an informed decision. Also, shifting the burden of proof 
might make you less susceptible to a phenomenon called confirmation 
bias. We have a tendency to look for evidence to confirm a given 
hypothesis and ignore counter-evidence. If your assumption is that 
slopes tend to be safe (as you might do if the bulletin suggests a low 
danger), you might end up ignoring, by being subject to such bias, 
important evidence that suggests otherwise. So, the main advice is 
simple: rationalize your choices and make them explicit.
 After all, it’s your life your are talking about.10
References 
Ebert, P. A. and Photopoulou, T. (2013). Bayes’ beacon: avalanche prediction, competence, and 
evidence for competence. In International Snow Science Workshop Grenoble – Chamonix Mont-
Blanc, pages 363–370. 
Ebert, P. A. and Robertson, S. (2013). A plea for risk. In O’Hear, A., editor, Philosophy and Sport, 
London Lecture Series. Cambridge University Press. 
Llewellyn, D. J., Sanchez, X., Asghar, A., and Jones, G. (2008). Self-efficacy, risk taking and performance 
in rock climbing. Personality and Individual Differences, 45(1):75–81. 
McCammon, I. (2004). Heuristic traps in recreational avalanche accidents: Evidence and implications. 
Avalanche News, 68:1–10. 
McCammon, I. and Hägeli, P. (2007). An evaluation of rule-based decision tools for travel in avalanche 
terrain. Cold Regions Science and Technology, 47(1-2):193–206. 
Zweifel, B. (2012). Jung & wild vs erfahren. Bergundsteigen, 4:78–82. 
Philip is as an Associate Professor in Philosophy at the University of Stirling, 
Scotland. He works in epistemology with interests in (amongst others) norms of 
reasoning, (Bayesian) rationality, and more recently decision-theory. He also has 
academic and personal 
interests in studying 
notions of risk and how to 
justify risk-taking. Since the 
age of four, Philip has been 
skiing and snowboarding 
and he was fortunate 
enough to spend numerous 
seasons in Chamonix. 
1Compare here (Ebert and Robertson, 2013).
2In the case of rock climbing this is shows in (Llewellyn, et al., 2008). It is tentatively suggested for ski-touring in (Zweifel, 2012).
3Compare (McCammon, 2004).
4We shall be very careful when employing such numbers since it is difficult to find relevant empirical data and so there is a lot of uncertainty here. In (Ebert and Photopoulou, 2013) we 
offer some reasons why a lower risk  (1 in 23) does not seem unreasonable. The phenomenon outlined below will be even more pronounced of we underestimate the relevant risks. This 
fact and considerations of simplicity motivate the use of 1 in 10.
5(McCammon and Hägeli, 2007) have assessed a wide variety of decision tools and they suggest that between 60-92% of accidents could be avoided. So for simplicity, we here assume 80% 
and assume a competent decision-maker is understood as someone who adheres perfectly to such decision-making tools.
6 Allowing decimals, your confidence should rise from 2.0 to 2.14, i.e. not very much at all.
7For an explanation of the calculation and the scale, see (Ebert and Photopoulou, 2013), section  5.
8This is a theme that is also discussed in the article “Situational Awareness Part 3: Projection” in this issue of TAR. In fact, many of the suggestions offered here are also discussed in that article.
9Compare scenario 1 in (Ebert and Photoulou, 2013) on p.367.
10For comments on earlier drafts of this paper I like to thank Nora Hanson, Bjørn Michaelsen, and the participants at his avalanche workshop in Skjervøy, Norway in April 2014, Walter 
Pedriali, Theoni Photopoulou, Simon Robertson, and Bruce Tremper. 
Competence most often leads to success, 
but success itself does not indicate competence.
